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and Contested States: The 
EU in northern Cyprus and 
Palestine
Dimitris Bouris1 and George Kyris2
Abstract
Combining the literature on sovereignty and Europeanisation, this article investigates the 
engagement and impact of the European Union (EU) on contested states (states lacking 
recognition) through a comparative study of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 
and Palestine. We find that characteristics of contested statehood mediate EU engagement and 
impact: the lack of international recognition limits EU’s engagement but encourages development 
promotion, international integration and assistance of local civil society. Lack of territorial 
control limits engagement, but ineffective government offers opportunities for development 
promotion and state-building. As such, and in addition to offering a rich empirical account of two 
prominent contested states, the article contributes to the discussion of international engagement 
by developing an innovative conceptual framework for understanding EU’s impact on contested 
states—a topic neglected within a literature dominated by conventional statehood or conflict 
resolution themes but very important given extensive international engagement in contested 
states—and related conflicts.
Keywords
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Introduction
The post-Maastricht re-launch of European Union’s (EU) international relations, the 
2004–2007 enlargement and the subsequent redrawing of its external borders brought 
the EU closer to a range of conflicts and a rather awkward type of states: self-declared 
states, which are not recognised by a significant part of the international community. 
Indeed, the majority of conflicts in the EU’s near abroad relate to such contested 
states, like Kosovo, Palestine, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh in the post-Soviet 
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space or, more recently, separatism in Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine. Further away, 
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Western Sahara, Somaliland and 
Taiwan are also invariably important for the international role of the EU, while the 
possibility of an independent but unrecognised Kurdistan shows the ongoing signifi-
cance of contested statehood in international politics.
Although the literature has tried to conceptualise the EU’s conflict resolution role (see 
Diez et al., 2008; Tocci, 2007; Whitman and Wolff, 2012), the issue of contested state-
hood and its implications for EU engagement remain under-researched. While some 
works on contested states have touched upon the so-called ‘engagement without recogni-
tion’ (see for example Caspersen, 2015; Cooley and Mitchell, 2010; Ker-Lindsay, 2015), 
EU studies have mainly focused on the impact of integration on the state from which the 
contested state attempts secession (Coppieters et al., 2004; Diez et al., 2008), how domes-
tic actors of contested states understand the EU (Popescu, 2007; Vahl and Emerson, 
2004), diplomatic issues (Papadimitriou and Petrov, 2012) or the EU’s efforts for state-
building but without taking into account contested statehood (Bieber, 2011; Börzel, 2011; 
Bouris, 2014). In this regard, this article addresses this gap in the literature by offering a 
comparison of the TRNC and Palestine in order to answer the following central research 
question: How do different parameters of contested statehood mediate the impact of the 
EU on contested states?
The article focuses on contested states as those entities that have declared independ-
ence, but are not recognised by a significant part of the international community, and 
which also display at least some degree of what are conventionally understood as state-
hood characteristics: a certain population, a territory, a government and capacity to enter 
into relations with third states (see Geldenhuys, 2009). Conceptually, the article draws 
upon debates on Europeanisation and sovereignty, the combination of which helps to 
account for how the impact of the EU is mediated by a set of parameters in contested 
states, namely, lack of international recognition, effective government and territorial con-
trol. Policy documents, official statements and a series of semi-structured interviews with 
EU officials and local elites involved with EU policies in Brussels, Nicosia, Jerusalem 
and Ramallah are analysed qualitatively. These interviews, dating back to crucial eras of 
EU involvement, help to triangulate the rest of material collected and provide new empir-
ical insights. They also support the key argument of this study: that the role and impact of 
the EU are compromised either because the lack of international recognition does not 
allow the development of meaningful relations and because the lack of territorial control 
obstructs/limits the EU’s ability to apply its policies on the ground. Yet we also find cer-
tain opportunities for the EU, namely that ineffective government allows the promotion 
of state-building, while non-recognition encourages the empowerment of civil society 
and/or greater international integration.
As such, the contribution of this article is twofold. First, it introduces an innovative 
framework that draws upon both international relations and European studies to offer a 
systematic conceptualisation of the Europeanisation of contested states, which, although 
highly important and topical, remains relatively under-researched. While not exploring in 
depth the relationship between Europeanisation process and the conflict trajectory, our 
analysis raises a range of questions on this relationship and aims to offer a blueprint for 
further research on the links between contested statehood, international engagement and 
conflict resolution. Second, the article offers a rich empirical account of the EU’s role in 
two prominent contested states. The article is structured as follows. The next section 
reflects on the conceptual framework and research design, and it is followed by a section 
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that focuses on the two case studies and, finally, a section offering comparative insights 
and avenues for further research.
Europeanisation and the different faces of sovereignty
In exploring the EU’s involvement and impact on contested states, this article engages 
with the Europeanisation literature, which has focused on EU-induced changes in 
national policy, institutions and politics (Börzel, 1999; Ladrech, 1994; Töller, 2010; 
Wallace, 2000). Having started as a debate regarding the impact of the EU on member 
states, Europeanisation scholars have also discussed the EU’s role vis-à-vis candidates 
for accession (Glenn, 2004; Grabbe, 2001; Sedelmeier, 2011) or third states (Lavenex 
and Uçarer, 2004: 419; Schimmelfennig, 2009: 8; Wallace, 2000: 371). Europeanisation 
is seen as a process of structural change that affects actors, institutions, interests, prac-
tices and ideas (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003) and comes as a response to EU policies 
and decisions. In terms of how this process of Europeanisation takes place, the literature 
points to three mechanisms, which guide the conceptual analysis of our empirical find-
ings. First, Europeanisation can be a result of compliance with institutional or policy 
directions. Earlier Europeanisation works focused on institutional compliance as a result 
of EU law implementation for existing (see for example Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002) or 
candidate EU member states (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). However, pres-
sures for institutional compliance can also be exerted upon third states not as a result of 
legal pressures to implement the acquis but because this is the only way for these coun-
tries to further their relations with the EU—this becomes relevant to this study, which 
focuses on cases outside the EU. In this context, studies have also looked at how neigh-
bours of the EU might comply with certain EU standards (Lavenex, 2008; Schimmelfennig, 
2009). Second, drawing on rational choice institutionalism, Europeanisation studies 
have also focused on changes to domestic opportunity structures, that is the distribution 
of power (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Finally, sociological institutionalism reflects on the 
socialisation of actors into certain practices (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Schmidt, 2001: 6) 
and how the EU can change domestic beliefs and expectations, styles, practices and 
‘ways of doing things’ (Radaelli, 2000: 44).
Because of the focus on contested states, this article considers state institutions as the 
starting point of analysis, although we find broader implications for the areas of civil 
society and political elites that are important to note vis-à-vis institutional changes. In this 
regard, we adopt a two-level analysis, discussing the engagement of the EU in contested 
states but focusing mainly on the impact of this engagement, which is central to the dis-
cussion of Europeanisation. A recurring theme within this debate has been how 
Europeanisation is mediated by national parameters, including a ‘misfit’ between what 
exists at the domestic level and the reforms promoted by the EU (Börzel and Risse, 2000; 
Cowles et al., 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). It is this focus on how different 
national parameters mediate the impact of the EU that also makes Europeanisation a use-
ful tool in understanding the EU’s engagement in contested states and the implications 
that their unique characteristics have for this engagement. This has been explored before 
(see Kyris, 2013, 2015), but the contribution of this article is that we further this 
Europeanisation discussion by combining it more explicitly and systematically with the 
concept of sovereignty, which helps identify lack of international recognition, territorial 
control and effective government as certain parameters of contested statehood and 
explores how they might mediate EU impact. We turn to the discussion on sovereignty 
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because of how central it is in the way states, contested or not, are approached by both 
scholars and international actors, like the EU.
While the ways in which it informs practice in world politics have changed over the 
years (see Jackson, 2007), the idea of sovereignty remains relatively stable and central to 
how we understand statehood. In a seminal conceptualisation of statehood, Krasner 
(2001) distinguishes between external (also referred to as negative—see Jackson, 1993) 
sovereignty and internal (or positive) sovereignty. While external sovereignty refers to 
the recognition of a state from outsiders in the international system, internal sovereignty 
refers to effective state structures and authority—what is often described as empirical 
statehood.
It follows from this that what is seen as the sine qua non characteristic of contested state-
hood is the lack of external sovereignty—that is, the fact that these entities are not recog-
nised as states by a significant part of the international community. Often resulting in 
extensive international isolation, the lack of statehood recognition should not be confused 
with the recognition of the right to statehood—what Geldenhuys (2009) calls ‘titular’ rec-
ognition. Many works on contested states have engaged with the concept of sovereignty 
(see Caspersen, 2012; Caspersen and Stansfield, 2011), and it is important to underline here 
that there exist many forms of interaction, such as trade, air and postal communication 
(Berg and Toomla, 2009) or membership of international organisations (Ker-Lindsay, 2012, 
2015), which, although not constituting external sovereignty per se, might add to sover-
eignty claims on behalf of contested states. Applying those ideas to understand contested 
states, we suggest that there is high external sovereignty where there is recognition by more 
than two-thirds of United Nations (UN) member states and low external sovereignty where 
less than one-third of UN members recognise, with the rest of contested states enjoying 
medium external sovereignty. This approach should be combined with a more qualitative 
analysis, which also accounts for titular recognition. As a result, we consider TRNC as hav-
ing low external sovereignty because it is only recognised by Turkey, while Palestine is 
considered to have high external sovereignty because it is recognised by more than two-
thirds of UN members and it also enjoys widespread titular recognition.
Contested states should also be conceptualised as demonstrating some lack of internal 
sovereignty—that is, de facto effective control of the government of the state over its ter-
ritory and people and, generally, effective economic and political systems and institutions 
(Clapham, 1998; Krasner, 2004). While this issue has been extensively discussed with 
reference to ‘weak’, ‘quasi’ or ‘failed’ states (Jackson, 1993; Migdal, 1988), we argue that 
it gains increased importance in cases of contested states. Often, territorial disputes and/
or secession efforts come with lack of control of the contested state government over its 
self-proclaimed territories. This is because the parent or reference state1 might be able to 
exercise control over those areas, such as in the case of Palestine. In 1993, the Oslo 
Accords created the Palestinian Authority (PA), tasked to control a number of non-contig-
uous population centres. With Oslo II, the West Bank was divided into three areas: it was 
only in Area A (17.7%) that the PA was given full administrative and security control. In 
Area B (21.3%), the PA was given civil control while Israel maintained security control. 
In Area C (61%), Israel would retain full responsibility and control.
But internal sovereignty also relates to the presence of effective governments, and the 
relatively young character of many of the existing contested states (8 of 12 declared inde-
pendence after 1983), coupled with the lack of international integration, might also result in 
weak state apparatuses. Palestine, for example, can be considered as having compromised 
internal sovereignty also in this respect. Linked to the fact that the state formation process 
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only started in 1993 (before this the West Bank and Gaza Strip were under full Israeli Civil 
Administration Control), Palestine should be considered as having low internal sovereignty 
by the time the EU embarked on engagement. TRNC, on the other hand, can be considered 
as displaying high internal sovereignty. This is because TRNC is a stable political and eco-
nomic system, including a centralised and effective government, public administration, a 
multi-party political system and a working economy and also effective control of the terri-
tories they claim (northern Cyprus). Turkish Cypriot dependency on Turkey for performing 
certain state functions (e.g. reliance on Turkish military for security) is crucial, but this 
dependency does not undermine their overall internal sovereignty, and as such, it is not at 
the focus of our discussion here. Interestingly, these two faces of sovereignty seem to be 
interrelated. For example, Caspersen (2015) has looked at strategies of ‘earned sovereignty’ 
and how contested states might seek to adopt values promoted by the international com-
munity with the hope to increase their external sovereignty, a strategy which can eventually 
reinforce what is understood as internal sovereignty.2
In this regard, a series of questions are raised as to whether processes of Europeanisation 
are mediated by different degrees of external and internal sovereignty. The existing lit-
erature on international engagement highlights certain problems that mostly relate to 
external sovereignty issues, particularly the fact that engagement is difficult because it 
is seen as recognition by implication, a problem that becomes especially acute where 
there is a parent state whose territorial integrity is prioritised and which is keen to veto 
engagement (see, for example, Herrberg, 2010; Ker-Lindsay, 2012). The literature has, 
therefore, found a ‘reluctant’ engagement (Caspersen, 2008)—but engagement never-
theless—which among others focuses on involving local leadership and civil society, 
especially moderates, and in peace processes (Berg and Pegg, 2016). In this regard, our 
analysis aims to discuss the different obstacles and also opportunities, thus also adding 
directly to the literature on ‘engagement’. Our study of the TRNC, which is heavily 
unrecognised, will seek to add to those analyses by moving away from discussion of 
broader engagement from the side of the international community and exploring EU 
engagement in specific and in more depth. What is more, by combining insights from the 
discussion on contested states and Europeanisation, this article also contributes to the 
literature by exploring not only the EU’s engagement per se but also its impact on the 
ground and how it is mediated by parameters that relate more to internal sovereignty, 
that is, state structures and territorial control. The focus on those internal characteristics 
of unrecognised states, tested in our case study of Palestine, is yet another way in which 
this article adds to the literature, which has been dominated by more external issues of 
international recognition.
To this end, our analysis draws on the conceptual discussion of sovereignty to account 
for how the lack of (a) international recognition and (b) territorial control and effective 
government (independent variables) mediate the engagement and impact of the EU 
(dependent variable) on TRNC and Palestine, respectively, which is posited to unravel via 
policy or institutional compliance, redistribution of power and/or changes in ideas and 
practices (casual mechanisms) offered by the Europeanisation literature. We look at the EU 
impact that has been shaped by parameters of contested statehood rather than EU-induced 
changes more generally. To ensure causality, we also focus exclusively on EU policies 
(rather than other processes, such as engagement from different international organisa-
tions; see also Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis, 2016). We explore our research question and 
test our independent variables (a) and (b) in the two cases of the TRNC and Palestine sepa-
rately and then we compare our findings. This is done because although Palestine and 
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TRNC are both contested states, they differ significantly when we look closer at the char-
acteristics of contested statehood with regard to the independent variable of this study: 
while TRNC lacks predominantly international recognition (independent variable a), 
Palestine has a greater deficit of territorial control and effective government (independent 
variable b). As a result, this variation with high and low values of the independent variable 
(high external sovereignty and low internal sovereignty in the TRNC, vice versa in 
Palestine) is especially conductive to heuristic case studies like these ones and allows us to 
uncover differences in the dependent variable and the casual mechanisms (George and 
Bennet, 2005). What is more, the choice of these two cases is also important for illustrating 
two more, related points often found in the literature: first, that sovereignty can have dif-
ferent degrees and should not be seen as absolute (see also Caplan, 2006: 12); second, that 
different degrees of internal and external sovereignty might co-exist. The small number of 
cases will allow to explore in depth the process of Europeanisation rather than simply its 
occurrence (Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis, 2016: 344–346; see also Van Era, 1997: 55 on 
cases studies). By doing so, we contend that our findings are an important starting point for 
exploring process of Europeanisation in the variety of contested states that exist today.
The EU in the TRNC
The failure of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus (RoC) established in 1960 led to conflict 
and the gradual territorial and administrative division of the island into two zones: the RoC 
is now monopolised by the Greek Cypriots in the south of the island, while in 1983 Turkish 
Cypriots officially self-declared their secessionist TRNC. Since then, the TRNC has had 
effective control of northern Cyprus, but is only recognised by Turkey. Conversely, RoC 
continues to be recognised as the only legitimate government of the country. So far, efforts to 
resolve the Cyprus conflict based on a federal reunification have failed. Following accession 
of Cyprus, the engagement of the EU with the Turkish Cypriots has had both practical and 
political reasons: officially, the whole of the island is an EU territory, but, in practice, north-
ern Cyprus remains an area that the government of the RoC cannot control. For that reason, 
EU law is suspended in the north (Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty). Yet the persisting 
potential for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict based on reunification means that the EU 
needs to prepare northern Cyprus for its full European integration, when a federation would 
replace the RoC as a member state. In this regard, the EU has tried to increase the chances of 
a successful resolution mostly by means of the Financial Aid Regulation (FAR) (Council of 
the European Union, 2006), which aims to assist development and preparation for EU law 
implementation, and the Green Line Regulation (GLR) (Council of the European Union, 
2005b), which facilitates trade between the two communities.
From the beginning, contested statehood and the low degree of external sovereignty 
put hermetic barriers between EU engagement and impact in northern Cyprus. The 
Commission’s plan for a preferential trade agreement between the EU and northern 
Cyprus was never implemented, largely because the Greek Cypriot–led RoC asserted that 
implementation would imply recognition of the TRNC. But lack of recognition has 
impacted even those instruments that have been adopted for northern Cyprus3 and has 
shaped the effect of the EU on the ground, often undermining the success of EU initia-
tives (TAIEX, 2009: 18). For example, because TRNC is not recognised, the Commission 
cannot use financial agreements with the local government as the legal basis for the aid 
provided. Instead, the EU had to respond with a more direct engagement, which tested its 
resources (European Court of Auditors, 2012: 2).
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In an effort to overcome the conundrum of dealing with an unrecognised state, some 
novel institutional solutions were introduced. While the government of the contested state 
enjoys an important role in the interaction with the EU and was required to make adjust-
ments in this regard (in a similar fashion to third states or candidates for accession—for 
more on institutional changes, see Kyris, 2015), the low degree of external sovereignty is 
responsible for the extensive role of local technocrats and civil society in managing EU 
affairs. For example, the highly technocratic EU Coordination Centre was established by 
the Turkish Cypriots in order to save Brussels from the risk of ‘recognition by implica-
tion’.4 Similarly, the EU has also opted for dealings with civil society. An interesting exam-
ple here is the role that the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) has gained in 
the GLR. The implementation of the regulation called for a series of trade tasks, such as 
the issue of trade documents and monitoring of trade, usually given to national ministries.5 
In this instance, however, the EU preferred to avoid formal interactions with public institu-
tions and delegated these responsibilities to the KTTO (European Commission, 2004), 
which in this way gained an unpredictably important influence over certain policies. 
Because of this, the KTTO established a strong lobbying office in Brussels, operating 
beyond the scope of the GLR strictly speaking. The KTTO is only one example of how the 
lack of external sovereignty has mediated the process of Europeanisation in the form of 
changing domestic power distribution (Europeanisation mechanism 2) towards an empow-
ered civil society as an alternative interlocutor with Brussels. Indeed, members of the 
European Parliament Group for the Turkish Cypriots also discuss how they tend to engage 
more with civil society, as a result of the non-recognition of the self-declared state.6 To this 
end and while the process of European integration has tended to favour national execu-
tives, in the contested TRNC the executive has an important role in dealing with the EU—
but so do non-state actors, like civil society or technocrats, who therefore enjoy policy 
knowledge and influence and better access to the international and EU environment.
Besides, the overall objective of the FAR is to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by 
encouraging Turkish Cypriot development, alignment with EU law and more contacts with 
the Greek Cypriots (Council of the European Union, 2006: 1.1). Towards these aims, the 
EU has provided financial assistance and expert seminars on issues such as preparation for 
legal approximation with EU law or training on the principles of effective transposition of 
legal texts (TAIEX, 2009: 18) and, generally, has facilitated the exchange of best practices 
and techniques (TAIEX, 2004: 12, 2005: 10). Here, the low degree of external sovereignty 
seems conducive to EU-induced reform of policy and administrative structures: because of 
the limited recognition, there is an important international isolation that comes with often 
outdated7 institutions and the misfit between Turkish Cypriot policies, practices and proce-
dures and what EU integration calls for.8 This situation leaves space for significant 
Europeanisation pressures to be exerted. However, because it is unclear if and when the 
island will reunify (which would make EU law applicable also in northern Cyprus), there 
are no strong institutional compliance pressures (mechanism number 1), neither does the 
EU prescribe very explicit institutional models. Instead, changes that occur can be better 
understood as an outcome of the socialisation of Turkish Cypriot elites with EU actors, 
such as in the context of TAIEX, whose activities have anyway focused on the transforma-
tion of the local mentality with regard to its adjustment to EU policies and practices.9 
Positive assessment from the side of the EU with regard to progress in a number of areas 
(such as environment, financial services—see TAIEX, 2007: 10, 2008: 20), as well as the 
approval of a range of new laws (for example competition law, health and safety) as a 
result of the FAR, suggests a process of Europeanisation through changes to practices and 
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‘ways of doing things’ (mechanism number 3), yet a far greater potential for change seems 
to be unrealised. This is because the EU cannot work as easily with authorities of the con-
tested state (Court of Auditors, 2012: 12) as well as because of the unclear prospects of 
reunification and application of EU law in northern Cyprus.
Similarly, the low degree of external sovereignty and the underdevelopment that has 
been caused by the non-recognition and isolation of the Turkish Cypriots have also shaped 
the way the EU has tried to assist socio-economic development. In an effort to boost infra-
structure, the EU has funded a projects on waste management, traffic safety and energy 
matters (European Court of Auditors, 2012: 5). The EU has also targeted development 
through grant schemes like Improving Agricultural Production. Other programmes have 
aimed at technical assistance and capacity-building, also through the inclusion of locals in 
EU-level processes. At the same time, the Commission also underlines problems that stem 
from international isolation and underdevelopment, such as an extraordinary demand for 
supervision or the beneficiaries’ lack of experience of claiming and managing EU grants 
(European Court of Auditors, 2012: 5). These problems can be considered as compromising 
the overall impact that the EU could achieve by fulfilling the objectives of the regulation.
Within development assistance, capacity-building of local civil society has been identi-
fied as a specific priority of the EU (Civil Society Support Team, 2009). Through the 
Cypriot Civil Society in Action programmes, the EU has sought to help locals, also in the 
context of reconciliation with the Greek Cypriots. Technical help seems to have been par-
ticularly important for the Turkish Cypriots. For example, because projects of other donors 
(e.g. UN) have traditionally been supervised by externals, the EU made an extra effort to 
increase the capacity of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to maintain owner-
ship of their activities.10 These efforts are important for the Europeanisation via change of 
practices and ideas (mechanism number 3) of those actors involved towards strengthening 
their internal organisation capacities and staff skills (Business and Strategies European 
Consortium, 2013: 34). By doing so, the EU’s assistance has also empowered local civil 
society (see Europeanisation mechanism number 2) and, in some instances, has allowed 
them to exit the constraints of the domestic arena (Goetz and Hix, 2001: 12) to pursue their 
objectives. For example, the EU has funded the bi-communal initiative Cyprus Island–
Wide NGO Development Platform (CYINDEP), which now participates in international 
platforms (Civicus, 2011). More locally, environmental organisations were invited to con-
sult the government in the preparation of legislation aligned to EU law.11 In this sense, the 
EU has often opened new avenues for influencing politics. This process is particularly 
crucial because influencing domestic affairs has been rather challenging (Business and 
Strategies European Consortium, 2013; INTRAC, 2011: 34). Despite those small positive 
steps, there is still a long way to go, and the long-term sustainability of a powerful civil 
society is questionable (European Court of Auditors, 2012: 23), particularly because the 
Turkish Cypriot political and legal system is not conducive.12
Last but not least, the FAR also aims at bringing locals ‘closer to the EU’ (Council of 
the European Union, 2006: Article 2) via specific instruments, the rationale of which is 
closely related to the issue of contested statehood:
From [their] isolation resulted a remarkable deficit of knowledge about the EU … It is therefore 
appropriate to enable the Turkish-Cypriots … to develop fruitful relations with other EU 
Member States (Council of the European Union, 2006: Article 1.1).
Although the locals’ unfamiliarity with EU practices has resulted in waves of frustra-
tion with what is seen as a time-consuming process of grant applications,13 the promotion 
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of youth exchanges and people-to-people contacts is a good example of how the EU 
assisted local organisations, who were the main beneficiaries via awarded projects such 
as participation in international festivals and study visits to the EU. The first call for pro-
posals for the scheme in 2007 was rather unsuccessful, and for the second call in 2009, 
the Commission devoted extra resources (European Commission, 2009) in order to 
increase the capacity of the locals as far as preparing applications was concerned, which 
was considered weak and a reason for the bad results of the first round (European 
Commission, 2009). Indeed, more than 85% of the second call grants were successfully 
claimed, offering evidence as to how the EU has increased the technical capacity and 
professionalism of local civil society. In this regard, low external sovereignty and the 
resulting isolation not only facilitated an EU-informed empowered civil society (mecha-
nism number 2) with more opportunities for links abroad, but the technical assistance 
towards preparing funding bids became an avenue for the communication of new ideas 
and practices (mechanism number 3). However, and as discussed before, the long-term 
sustainability of this impact in such an unstable country is questionable.
The EU in Palestine
The reasons for the contested statehood of Palestine can be traced back to the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent British withdrawal from these territories. In 
Resolution 181, the UN decided upon the division of Palestine into two states, Arab and 
Jewish, and the internationalisation of Jerusalem. In the aftermath of the 1967 War, Israel 
occupied the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), Gaza and the Golan Heights. On 15 
November 1988, Yasser Arafat, President of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), proclaimed the State of Palestine based on UN Resolution 181. In 2012, the UN 
decided to upgrade Palestine from ‘non-member observer entity’ to ‘non-member observer 
state’ with a majority of 138 states voting in favour. The upgrade reconfirmed that 
Palestinians enjoy a certain degree of ‘titular’ recognition. Linked to the fact that 137 states 
already recognise Palestine, it enjoys a higher degree of external sovereignty compared to 
the TRNC. Conversely, it is the lack of internal sovereignty, in the form of weaker state 
structures and control over the territory that the Palestinians claim, which mainly defines 
Palestine and is explored in relation to the process of Europeanisation here.
As mentioned above, the 1993 Oslo Accords created a number of non-contiguous popu-
lation centres and areas upon which the PA did not have full control. Coupled with the fact 
that no formal institutions existed before Oslo entrenched the low degree of internal sover-
eignty of Palestine, although, at the same time, this situation also provided the EU with 
state-building opportunities. The EU provided half the funding needed for the setting up of 
the PA’s institutions following the 1993 Oslo Accords because it was hoped that building 
Palestinian institutions would be a first step towards the establishment of a Palestinian state 
and the end of the conflict (Bouris, 2014: 73; Le More, 2005: 27). The EU was also involved 
in the complex structure that was created in 1993–1994 to coordinate aid in Palestine and 
the 12 working groups, replaced by four Strategy Groups in 2005, which target different 
aspects of state-building such as economy, governance, infrastructure and social develop-
ment. As such, the EU and its member states have been directly involved in every facet of 
the state-building project conducted in Palestine, including the establishment of the PA gov-
ernment’s institutions and structures, such as ministries and public administration.
This involvement unleashed Europeanisation pressures because, through its engage-
ment, the EU has been able to impact the institutional development of Palestine via 
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compliance with institutional directions as well as through change of practices. The legal 
basis for this has been the Interim Association Agreement signed between the EU and the 
PLO, on behalf of the PA in 1997. The Action Plan, concluded in 2005 on the basis of this 
agreement, prioritised structural changes relating to PA institutions, including judicial and 
electoral reform, effective enforcement of legislation, open, fair and free elections, trans-
parency of public finances and the restructuring of civil service and security (EU-PA 
Action Plan, 2005). These prescriptions had a strong impact as they were mostly imple-
mented on the ground by the Palestinians, who embarked on the requested domestic 
reforms, such as the holding of elections in 2006. Another example of EU-induced 
changes via specific institutional prescriptions (mechanism number 1) has been the pres-
sure exerted on the Palestinian leadership in 2002 for the adoption and entry into force of 
the Basic Law, legislation on the independence of the judiciary and abolition of the State 
Security Courts. In 2003, EU pressure also resulted in the revision of the Palestinian 
Basic Law and the creation of a prime ministerial post. The rationale behind this was to 
curb the powers concentrated in the hands of Palestinian President Arafat, and this change 
impacted not only the new institutional design but also the distribution of political power.
Because of contested statehood conditions, and particularly owing to the low degree of 
internal sovereignty and the lack of well-functioning core state institutions (such as, for 
example, security institutions), the EU deployed two civilian missions in Palestine in 
order to help the PA reform its security sector. The first, EUBAM Rafah, was deployed in 
2005 at Rafah Crossing Point in order to (a) assist the PA to build capacity on border 
management and customs, (b) evaluate the PA’s application of the procedures, (c) contrib-
ute to confidence building between Israel and the PA, (d) ensure effective border control 
and, finally, (e) contribute to the liaison between the Palestinian, Israeli and Egyptian 
authorities in all aspects of border management at Rafah (Council of the European Union, 
2005a). The second mission, EUPOL COPPS, provides training, advice and equipment to 
the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) and also works closely with Palestinian institutions 
such as the ministries of justice and interior. Officials of the Civilian Planning and 
Conduct Capability and the Political and Security Community responsible for EUPOL 
COPPS underline how they have assisted the drafting of the Code of Conduct on the Use 
of Force and Firearms (already entered into force) and helped the relevant ministries with 
drafting the Police Law and the Criminal Procedure Law.14 In this regard, the develop-
ment of EUPOL COPPS has triggered the socialisation of the PCP officers and civil serv-
ants into certain practices and styles as well as ‘ways of doing things’ (see mechanism 
number 3). The missions have also had an impact on the strengthening of internal organi-
sation capacities and staff skills. As an official from the PCP states, ‘We now have the 
ability to train our people and our own policemen and all this thanks to the EU’.15
Yet, contested statehood conditions and the lack of Palestinian control over the territo-
ries they claim (linked to Israel’s control of those areas) have had rather negative implica-
tions for the operationalisation of both missions on the ground and the impact that the EU 
has exerted. In the case of EUBAM Rafah, for example, Israel had the upper hand on 
whether the European monitors would be permitted to reach Rafah and, consequently, 
whether the border crossing would be open or not. Israel also had the ultimate control of 
the rest of the crossing points in and out of Gaza. Similarly, EUPOL COPPS also faced 
limitations because its staff can be present only where the Palestinian police are permitted 
to operate, and this decision is taken by the Israeli Defense Forces. The deployment of 
both missions on the ground allowed the EU to have a say and impact on two of the ‘final 
status’ issues (security and borders) affecting the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian 
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conflict (Bouris, 2012: 262), but, at the same, the missions’ operationalisation, and the 
related potential for Europeanisation, has directly been affected because of the realities of 
the Israeli occupation and Palestine’s lack of internal sovereignty. Because of the restric-
tions imposed by Israel (see above), a range of training or running of broader projects on 
border management, human rights, customs and capacity-building could not take place.
Like the TRNC, the Palestinian contested state suffers from a broader underdevelop-
ment, which goes beyond state institutions and touches upon the economy and infrastruc-
ture. However, in this case, it is more a result of the low degree of internal sovereignty. 
Because of the lack of territorial control and developed state institutions, new opportuni-
ties for Europeanisation exist, not only in the domains of institutional changes but also in 
development policies. Palestine is the second biggest recipient of EU development aid 
after Turkey and has received more than €6 billion since 1994 (European Commission, 
2013). Between 1994 and 1998, 40% of European money was channelled into construc-
tion, infrastructure and institution building (European Commission, 2013: 88).
At the same time, the low degree of internal sovereignty, manifested in the deficit of 
Palestinian control over the territories they claim, severely limited the impact of the EU in 
implementing its development projects in Palestine. The division of the West Bank, in areas 
A, B and C, has meant that the EU could take initiatives and implement its projects mainly in 
area A, whereas for projects in areas B and C, prior approval had to be given by Israel. As a 
result, the EU and the PA were allowed to plan development projects only in 1% of area C, 
which is a stark example of economic disablement. But even in cases where such an approval 
was given, Israel would still decide over the future fate of these projects. In March 2012, for 
example, Štefan Füle presented a list of 82 EU-funded projects worth almost €30 million, 
which were destroyed by Israel from the burst of the second intifada (2000) until 2011. More 
recently, and as a response to the EU’s decision to prohibit the awarding of EU grants, loans 
or prizes to Israeli entities based in the occupied Palestinian territories, the Israeli Minister of 
Defence instructed Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories to cease joint 
projects with the EU (Sherwood, 2013). To this end, the realities on the ground make it 
extremely difficult for both the PA and the EU to reliably plan and implement economic 
development measures—which also limits the engagement and impact of the EU.
A more political EU-induced redistribution of power has also taken place, which 
favours elites and actors that are perceived as supportive of a compromised solution to the 
conflict (mechanism number 2). In 2006, following Hamas’ electoral victory, the EU 
decided to freeze its direct aid by establishing a Temporary International Mechanism 
which would channel money directly to people and projects, bypassing the Hamas-led 
government. This reallocation of resources signalled an EU-informed loss of power for 
Hamas. Further and since 2007, the EU has engaged only with the Fatah-led West Bank 
government, which has been perceived as being in favour of negotiations and peace with 
Israel. The low degree of internal sovereignty had an impact on this EU-induced redistri-
bution of power: the fact that the constituting territorial parts (the West Bank and Gaza) 
of what is called Palestine are physically disconnected has facilitated the EU’s engage-
ment and empowerment of the Fatah-led West Bank while Gaza has remained under 
political and also physical isolation.
Opportunities and limitations for the EU in contested states
Different parameters of contested statehood in northern Cyprus and Palestine have shaped 
the role and impact of the EU, providing important examples for Europeanisation in 
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contested states. Testing our intervening variable of lack of international recognition in 
the TRNC, we found that inability of the EU to engage with the authorities of a contested 
state that suffers limited external sovereignty has not allowed the realisation of the full 
potential of its aims. At the same time, the international isolation which comes with lack 
of recognition is also responsible for the low absorption capacity of Turkish Cypriots, 
which also creates further complications, such as delays in projects and extraordinary 
needs for supervision. Based on these findings a series of questions emerge for the wider 
future debate on the EU. For example, what does this compromised engagement mean for 
the resolution of the related conflict? Recently, in TRNC, the failure of the EU to fulfil its 
promises has damaged its credibility and ability to mobilise people towards resolution of 
the dispute, like what happened during the Annan Plan in 2004. Having said that, the 
ongoing isolation of the TRNC might still be an incentive for locals to support a reunifica-
tion plan again, as their only way out to full international existence as parts of a reunified 
Cyprus. Also, does the realisation that political uncertainty compromises EU engagement 
lead to greater efforts for resolving the conflict? Finally, this article has suggested that the 
EU’s engagement in contested states is difficult because of the lack of international rec-
ognition, but, given the different degrees of external sovereignty that exist across con-
tested states, are there any variations in this difficulty? Are there, for example, contested 
states where there is more room for engagement and/or influence compared to others, and 
if yes, why?
We can answer some of these questions by comparing northern Cyprus to Palestine, 
which differ as far international recognition is concerned. Indeed, a greater external sov-
ereignty in the case of Palestine has meant a much heavier EU involvement. This, how-
ever, is not to underestimate the challenges that in this case stem from the low degree of 
internal sovereignty and ineffective state structures and authority over parts of the self-
declared territory, which we tested separately as different intervening variables. Low 
internal sovereignty has limited the ability of the EU to promote its goals in those areas. 
The territorial fragmentation of territories controlled by the PA and the simultaneous 
Israeli control of the most part of self-declared territories of the contested state mean that 
almost everything has to be approved by Israel first, which has long remained the final 
arbiter of both the EU initiatives and the Palestinian life. This has been the case with the 
two EU civilian missions, as well as the EU-funded development and infrastructure pro-
jects. Ultimately, this compromises the chances of a successful two-state solution. With 
many contested states facing challenges in fully controlling their declared territories, our 
analysis can inform more research on the EU’s ability to engage and how this is limited 
by the lack of internal sovereignty.
At the same time, however, the unique parameters of contested statehood also offer sev-
eral opportunities for the role and impact of the EU. In both cases, the EU had the opportu-
nity to address underdevelopment, which comes as a result of contested statehood. In 
northern Cyprus, the low degree of external sovereignty has resulted in years of interna-
tional isolation and a considerable gap between what the EU would like to foster and what 
exists locally, where institutions and policies are acquis incompatible and people remain 
unfamiliar with EU-promoted policies and practices. This gap has increased Europeanisation 
pressures upon Turkish Cypriot policies and institutions—through technical and financial 
assistance—and here, Europeanisation takes place via the change of practices (mechanism 
number 3) towards development and preparation for EU law implementation. The role of 
the EU (and therefore the extent of Europeanisation) has not fully materialised because of 
the challenging diplomatic context of contested statehood, but this limitation does not 
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undermine the EU-induced changes explained so far or the potential for further 
Europeanisation. Palestine presents a similar story, although it is the limited internal sover-
eignty that mediates EU engagement and Europeanisation. Here, weak state structures pro-
vide room for the Europeanisation of institutions and policies through state-building and, 
ultimately, the strengthening of internal sovereignty (at least when it comes to institutions). 
Yet, despite the fact that the international community in 2011 praised the improvement and 
functioning of Palestinian institutions (see International Monetary Fund, 2011: 66; United 
Nations (UN), 2011: 1; World Bank, 2010: 5), progress has not been linear16 and has faced 
severe limitations because of Israel’s policies, as well as the inability of the Palestinians to 
fully control their territories. Despite these limitations, when we look at both cases in com-
parison, it is clear that the misfit between the domestic status quo and what the EU would 
like to promote facilitates a certain process of Europeanisation, through changing both ideas 
and practices (mechanism number 3) as well institutional or policy compliance (in the case 
of Palestine, mechanism number 1). Assisting the development of contested states might 
create a short-term intransigence on the ‘other side’ (here, the Greek Cypriots and Israel) but 
has potential for the long-term chances for peace. In Cyprus, for example, narrowing the 
gap that exists between the developed south and the relatively underdeveloped north is 
crucial for a smooth implementation of a federal agreement. Similarly, state-building initia-
tives in Palestine have been used as a conflict resolution tool, which could eventually help 
the implementation of a two-state solution.
Beyond development, the lack of internal or external sovereignty offers further opportu-
nities for Europeanisation. In the TRNC, the low degree of external sovereignty has enabled 
the EU to help individuals and civil society to participate more in international processes. 
The non-recognition of the TRNC has added to the prioritisation of non-state actors instead 
of authorities from the contested state, which become diplomatically risky interlocutors. 
This has meant two things for Europeanisation: first, promotion of unique institutional solu-
tions, whereby public authorities are replaced by technocrats or civil society, and, second, 
the consequent empowerment of those actors, particularly those that were able to capitalise 
in their already strong capacity, like the KKTO (mechanism number 2). These are important 
insights and contribute to the existing literature, which has mostly focused on how the inter-
national community engages with civil society in similar conflicts because of its important 
role in reconciliation (see Berg and Pegg, 2016; Caspersen and Herrberg, 2010). Yet this 
article looked at civil society beyond reconciliation strictly speaking and added details with 
regard to the specificities of contested statehood and the role of the EU. These new findings 
need to be combined with existing knowledge on civil society and reconciliation in order to 
reflect on how this process of Europeanisation might impact conflict resolution. In Cyprus, 
civil society continues to promote reconciliation, but this process does not seem to be a 
result of EU assistance. Indeed, EU officials have explained that they viewed the dominance 
of the reconciliation agenda in civil society organisations as an unhealthy sign of over-
politicisation, which they tried to mend by funding organisations with different aims.17 
Consequently, the relation between civil society promotion and reconciliation in contested 
states in particular should be problematised more systematically. At the same time, EU 
processes and actors also need to be examined in more detail. While this study has offered 
evidence that there exist opportunities for the international integration of locals from con-
tested states, whether certain European processes or institutions are more open to contested 
states is a question that needs further investigation.
What is also noteworthy is that the case of Palestine seems to be the opposite of the 
TRNC as far as state institutions are concerned: while the low degree of external 
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sovereignty results in EU avoidance of state institutions in northern Cyprus, the low 
degree of internal sovereignty leads to engagement with and assistance of state institu-
tions in Palestine. This is also because Palestine enjoys greater external sovereignty in 
comparison with the TRNC. The main objective is to help Palestine address the absence 
of an effective state apparatus and to build a state which would eventually contribute to 
the resolution of the conflict. EU assistance might have allowed Palestine to move up the 
sovereignty ‘ladder’ as far as effective governance is concerned; however, ongoing prob-
lems of territorial control mean that Palestine continues to display low internal sover-
eignty. This outcome seems to suggest that while governance incapacity offers 
opportunities for Europeanisation, the other aspect of limited internal sovereignty, that is, 
ineffective territorial control, limits EU engagement.
Conclusion
Preoccupied with conventional states, the European studies literature has neglected con-
tested states. This article has addressed this gap in the literature through a comparative 
discussion that analysed how the lack of international recognition, territorial control and 
effective government in contested states mediate the engagement and impact of the EU. 
Our findings—a major empirical contribution in their own—make clear that parameters of 
contested statehood compromise the involvement of the EU because of its inability to deal 
with contested state authorities and/or engage in territories that are under the control of the 
parent/reference state rather than the contested state. At the same time, however, there exist 
unique opportunities for the EU to make an impact, especially through the assistance of 
state-building and broader development, as well as international integration. These find-
ings and the proposed conceptual framework from which they emanate are important for 
understanding the ability of the EU to exert an influence beyond traditional intergovern-
mental contexts and promote security and reconciliation. Yet, with conflict resolution 
being the ultimate aim of the EU and other international actors in most contested states, 
this study aspires to encourage more research on the links between international engage-
ment, contested statehood and the promotion of security and reconciliation.
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Notes
 1. Parent or reference state suggests a recognised state that is part of a dispute with a self-declared, con-
tested state (such as the Republic of Cyprus vs Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) or Israel vs 
Palestine).
 2. For a more in-depth discussion on ‘earned sovereignty’, see Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2012), Scharf (2004) 
and Williams and Pecci (2004).
 3. Interview with European Commission Official ‘C’, Brussels, May 2009.
 4. Interview with Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) Member, Brussels, 2009.
 5. Interview with European Commission Official A, Brussels, May 2009.
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 6. Interview with Member of the European Parliament, Brussels, May 2009.
 7. Interview with Turkish Cypriot Official A, 2009
 8. Email interview with Turkish Cypriot Official B, 2014.
 9. Interview with European Commission Official D, Brussels, May 2009.
10. Interview with European Commission Official A, Brussels, May 2009.
11. Email Interview with Turkish Cypriot Official B, 2014
12. Interview with European Commission Official B, Brussels, May 2009.
13. Interview with KTTO Member, Brussels, May 2009; interview with European Union (EU) Official E, 
Brussels, May 2009; interview with Turkish Cypriot official, Nicosia, September 2009.
14. Interview with a EUPOL COPPS official, Ramallah, 19 June 2015.
15. Interview with a Palestinian Civil Police official, Ramallah, 29 May 2010.
16. It could be argued that there are three periods of state-building in Palestine: the first is between 1993 and 
2000 which was interrupted by the burst of the second intifada; the second period of state-building started 
in 2002/2003 with the Roadmap until the 2006 elections; the third one, from 2007 until today, where 
because of the division of West Bank Fatah-led government and the Hamas-led Gaza Strip, the state-
building project has mainly focused on the West Bank.
17. Interview with European Commission Official D, Nicosia, September 2009.
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